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Abstract 
We have examined the way in which local Chinese firms confronted with a 
technology gap have achieved growth, using the Chinese handset industry as a 
case study. Chinese local firms have lacked technology, and have therefore turned 
to outside firms for development, design, and manufacturing, while they 
themselves have focused on sales and marketing, using their advantage of 
familiarity with the Chinese market. Consequently, by establishing a growth 
condition in which their selection of boundaries counterbalances the technology 
gap they have been able to expand their market share in comparison with foreign 
firms. 
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1. Introduction 
 
How do local firms in developing countries achieve growth when confronted by a 
technology gap between themselves and foreign firms from developed countries? We 
answer the question by examining the behaviour of China’s mobile-phone handset 
manufacturers, who have managed to compensate for their technology deficit by 
differentiating the organization of the firm. By examining this process, the paper casts 
light on the growth of local firms in a context of economic globalization. 
 It is tempting to assume that if there is a comprehensive and rapid diffusion of 
technology from foreign firms to local firms as a result of foreign direct investment 
(FDI), such diffusion should enable local firms to grow steadily by attracting FDI. 
However this is by no means always the case. Previous studies have shown that FDI has 
both positive and negative spillover effects on the growth of local firms. For example, 
Kokko (1994), using Mexican data, shows that FDI can have a positive effect. By 
contrast, Aitken and Harrison (1999) show that in Venezuela, FDI has had a negative 
spillover effect on the productivity of local firms. Djankov and Hoekman (2001) show 
that in the Czech Republic, FDI has had a negative impact on the sales growth of local 
firms. In addition, it also has become evident that in order to realize the potential 
possibilities of technological diffusion, local firms need to be equipped with the 
technological absorptive capacity to make the diffusion possible. Girma (2005) and 
Kinoshita (2001) show that FDI can increase the productivity of local firms, 
respectively when the technology gap is a small one, and when local firms also invest in 
R&D activities. To summarize, the existing literature shows that technology diffusion 
does not always occur. Recently, as in the case of analyses of absorptive capacity, 
studies have focussed on growth conditions by investigating circumstances inside local 
firms. 
 By examining the way in which indigenous Chinese firms compete with 
foreign firms, we can confirm the existence of a growth pattern relating to the 
organization of the firm. From investigating this pattern, we can extract another growth 
condition. Investigating indigenous Chinese firms in the electrical and electronics 
industry, Ohara (1998), Kimura (2006) and Marukawa (2007) have shown that, even 
though such firms have been confronted by a technology deficit, they have compensated 
for it by buying key components for products from other firms, and by focusing on sales 
and marketing, both of which are not directly related to product technology. For 
example, even though Haier lacked the technology needed to make compressors, which 
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are key components of air-conditioners, they succeeded in marinating their 
competitiveness by focussing their efforts on point-of-purchase and after-sales services 
(Ohara 1988). In other words, they have achieved growth by compensating for their 
technology deficit. 
As shown above, although various aspects of growth have been studied thus far, 
the general decision-making process as exemplified by the make-or-buy policy followed 
by local firms has not been analyzed explicitly. In this paper, we investigate the 
decision-making characteristics of Chinese firms within a framework set by the 
limitations imposed by the technology gap, in order to see whether a growth condition 
can be identified. To do this, we take China’s handset industry as our case study. 
Although handset production calls for an advanced technological capability, local 
Chinese firms have grown successfully, especially since the end of 1990s. We hope that 
the case study will illustrate and clarify the behavior of indigenous Chinese firms that 
are confronted by a technology deficit. 
As regards our methodology, we begin by examining the nature of the 
technology gap that sets the parameters within which the firm must operate. In the 
existing literature on technology diffusion, it has generally been assumed that 
manufacturing a product embodies a single technology, whereas in reality, several 
technologies are usually involved, and in many kinds of product manufacture, a whole 
hierarchical system of technologies can be employed. Firms in pursuit of product 
differentiation need to employ higher-level technology. However, to master higher-level 
technology and to come up with ideas for the essential product differentiation associated 
with higher-level technology, firms often need to accumulate, in the course of their 
development, sufficient experience and know-how in the use of lower-level technology. 
This means that it is difficult for latecomers, such as local firms who have little 
experience of development, to absorb all the available technologies in a short period of 
time. As will be shown below, the handset industry consists of technologies arranged in 
three levels, a feature that presents difficulties for local firms hoping to use technology 
as a means of achieving differentiation. This is far less of a problem for foreign firms, 
which have already accumulated sufficient experience. 
We next go on to study boundaries selection. The theory of boundaries 
employed in this paper has been developed by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and 
Moore (1990), who argue that to solve hold-up problems incurred by incomplete 
contracts, firms decide to internalize outside firms and maximize the increase in their 
productivity through investment in relation-specific human capital. Human capital 
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includes factors such as technology, knowledge, and accumulated experience, all of 
which increase the value of products and enhance the firms’ profits. 
 If we incorporate the existence of a technology gap into the theory of 
boundaries, decision-making among local firms can be generalized as follows. When 
local firms face a significant technology gap, they do not integrate the production 
process related with the technology, but instead of integration, they buy goods and 
services from outside firms. This is because, even if they intended to invest human 
capital in achieving a level of technology as high as that employed by foreign firms, 
their investment would not increase the value of the products because of their lack of 
experience in the use of the level technology. On the other hand, if there are production 
processes in which the investment in human capital by indigenous firms is substantially 
more effective than that by foreign firms, the indigenous firms tend to internalize the 
processes and make goods and provide services by themselves. In other words, the 
behavior of local firms maximizes the effects of human capital investment so as to 
compensate for the technology deficit. Consequently, a condition of growth is the extent 
to which indigenous firms facing a technology deficit can employ potential human 
capital in such a way that the investment effects of the capital become at least equal to 
the disadvantages of the deficit. Thus, growth depends on whether or not local firms can 
compensate for the technology deficit by differentiating the boundaries of the firm. In 
this regard, the findings of previous studies, that absorptive capacity brings growth, 
become relevant. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
review the growth pattern of indigenous firms by providing an introduction to the 
growth of the Chinese handset industry. In sections 3 and 4, we investigate the 
relationship between the technology gap and boundaries in two industrial development 
phases. The final section draws together our arguments into a conclusion. 
 
 
2. Growth and Boundaries of Local Firms 
 
In this chapter, for purposes of the main analysis, we review the relationship between 
the growth and boundaries of local firms on the one hand, and characteristics of the 
Chinese handset market on the other. The review of the relationship enables us to verify 
that growth corresponds to a specific selection of boundaries along with each industrial 
development phase. Although output, added value, and profits can be used as measures 
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of expansion, as an indicator of growth we here use the market share of local firms as 
opposed to that of foreign ones. We have chosen this indicator because in this paper, we 
are interested primarily in the growth of local firms in competition with foreign firms, 
and we wish to measure the growth of local firms against that of foreign ones in 
comparative perspective. Changes in market share suggest that the growth of local firms 
can be divided into three phases. 
 
2.1. The First Phase 
 
Although the market share of indigenous Chinese handset manufacturers has increased 
since 1999, during the first phase, which lasted until 1998, the market was almost 
entirely dominated by foreign companies. About 80 percent of the market was held by 
the three companies of Motorola (United States), Nokia (Finland), and Ericsson 
(Sweden, at present Britain in the form of Sony Ericsson). The remaining market share 
was accounted for by foreign firms such as Siemens (German), Royal Philips 
Electronics (the Netherlands), NEC (Japan) and Matsushita (Japan, at present in the 
form of Panasonic Mobile Communications). 
Though the Chinese government and some local firms intended to manufacture 
handsets domestically, domestic production was not a commercial success. Some 
Chinese firms processed handsets through contract manufacturing from foreign firms, 
and the Chinese government also facilitated a nationalization project that involved some 
indigenous firms. However, between foreign and local firms, there were significant gaps 
in technology, and shortage of funds, in particular, meant that there was an absence of 
core component technology, a problem that resulted in increases in production costs 
(Xinxi Chanye Bu Jingji Tizhi Gaige yu Jingji Yunxing Si 2003). In short, local firms 
were prevented from expanding their market share by a persistent technology gap. 
 
2. 2. The Second Phase 
 
In the second phase of growth, from 1999 to 2003, local firms continuously expanded 
their market share, from 5.3% (in 1999) to 52.9% (in 2003 - see Figure 1). This 
expansion went hand-in-hand with a rapid increase in the number of subscribers.1 There 
                                                 
1 In China, the GSM, CDMA as 2G and TD-SCDMA as 3G channel access methods are in operation. We 
have chosen GSM because it has the most subscribers, and unless otherwise stated, our remarks 
throughout the paper apply to GSM. CDMA is used by only 10% of Chinese subscribers, and use of 
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has been a sustained increase in the number of subscribers ever since the start of the 
mobile telephone service in China, and numbers have grown swiftly, especially since 
the late 1990s (see Figure 2). About 60 million people have subscribed since 2001 and 
in 2008, the total national number of subscribers amounted to more than 800 million 
people. 
 
Figure 1: Share of local firms, 1999-2006 
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Note: The share in 2005 is for January to September. 
Sources: Data for 1999 to 2002 are from Ministry of Information Industry (2003). Zhongguo Dianzi Gongye Nianjian (2003) 
[Yearbook of the Chinese Electronics Industry (2003)]. Beijing: Publishing House of Electronics Industry. 
Data for 2003 to 2004 are from CCID (China Center for Information Industry Development). 
Data for 2005 are from Ministry of Information Industry (2006). "2005-nian Woguo Shouji Chanye Fazhan Pingshu [Commentary 
on Development of Our Country's Mobile-Phone Handsets Industry in 2005]." April 5, 2006, accessed at 
http://www.mii.gov.cn/  (in Chinese) 
Data for 2006 are from Ministry of Information Industry (2007). 2007 Zhongguo Xinxi Chanye Nianjian (Dianzi Juan) [Yearbook of 
the Chinese Information Industry (Volume of Electronics)]. Beijing: Publishing House of Electronics Industry. (in Chinese) 
 
                                                                                                                                               
TD-SCDMA has just begun, a test installation having gone into operation in April 2008. In addition to the 
carriers mentioned in the paper, there are two others, namely China Mobile and China Unicom. China 
Mobile operates the GSM and TD-SCDMA systems, while China Unicom uses GSM and CDMA. 
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Figure 2: The number of users, 1990-2008 
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Note: Fixed telephone includes the Chinese PHS system. 
Sources: Data for 1995 to 2007 are from National Bureau of Statistics (various years). Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian [Statistical 
Yearbook of China]. Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji. 
Data for 2008 are from Ministry of Industry and Information Techonology. June 24, 2009, accessed at http://www.miit.gov.cn/ (in 
Chinese) 
 
What triggered the increase in subscribers was the adoption in 1999 of a new 
industrial policy that favored local firms. Concerned that local firms might fail to seize 
the opportunity offered by the expansion of demand, the Chinese government instituted  
a license system for entry (in effect a protective barrier), provided subsidies to local 
firms for research and development expenditure, and enacted local content legislation 
aimed at foreign firms. The license system had a particularly important effect, for it 
helped local firms to enter into the market in the early development phase by blocking 
the new entry of foreign firms. Licensing was eased in 2005 and finally abandoned in 
2007. 
While it was in operation, this protective policy led to an upsurge in the 
number of entries of local firms into the industry. The great majority of the new entrants, 
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however, did not have the technological capabilities or the experience necessary for 
success in the handset business. Although telecommunication equipment manufacturers, 
such as ZTE and Huawei, which were relatively well endowed with technological 
capabilities also entered, most of the new entrants came from the home electric 
appliance and consumer electronics sectors, neither of which were related to the 
manufacture of wireless communication devices. In this article, we pay attention to 
major firms such as Bird, TCL, Konka, and Lenovo, which became handset 
manufacturers during the early years of regulation of entry into the industry. In addition, 
along with this trend, firms from various origins, such as distributors, entered the 
industry one after the other, with the result that the market became more competitive, 
involving many local firms which lacked the technological ability and experience for 
entering the handset business. Moreover, the number of illegal handsets has been 
increasing in line with the growth of the market.2 
 After local firms entered, they expanded their market share (see Table 1). In 
this phase, a peculiarity of the local firms was that their boundaries were centered on 
sales. Lacking technological ability and experience, the major local firms bought 
handsets manufactured by companies in South Korea and Taiwan region and sold them 
in the protected Chinese domestic market. At the same time, they themselves focussed 
their activities on sales. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 “Illegal handsets” means nonregistered handsets for gaining access to mobile networks, imitation 
products and contraband sets. Before deregulation, handsets produced by manufacturers without the 
necessary license were also deemed to be illegal handsets. 
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Table 1: Market share by major firms, 1999-2008 
(%)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007* 2008**
Foreign firms
Nokia 32.3 25.1 22.3 18.2 11.1 15.0 23.8 33.6 28.9 37.2
Samsung n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 8.3 9.6 9.0 11.1 14.3
Motorola 39.4 35.4 29.3 28.5 9.3 8.9 13.3 24.1 18.8 8.6
Sony Ericsson*** 6.4 9.2 6.5 2.1 1.1 2.9 4.1 7.4 5.5 3.1
Philips n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.
Siemens 6.0 8.1 9.7 4.7 2.5 1.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Local firms
Tianyu n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.3 4.9
Lenovo n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.7 6.5 4.0
Amoi n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.1 3.2 2.7
Bird n.a. 3.2 6.4 9.9 14.2 10.2 6.1 4.1 4.3 2.5
Gionee n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.1 2.0
Konka n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 6.2 5.8 2.8 2.5 1.8 1.4
TCL n.a. 1.0 3.0 8.7 11.2 6.5 3.7 1.9 n.a. n.a.
a.
 
Note 1: * Data for 2007 are as of April, 2007. 
2: ** Data for 2008 are for the first quarter of 2008. 
3: *** The share given for Sony Ericsson before October, 2001, is for Ericsson. 
Sources: Data for 1999 to 2004 are from the Ministry of Information Industry (various years). Zhongguo Dianzi Xinxi Chanye 
Tongji Nianjian [Statistical Yearbook of Chinese Electronics and Information Industry]. Beijing: Publishing House of 
Electronics Industry. 
Data for 2005 are from Norson Telecom Consulting. April 5, 2006, accessed at http://www.norson.com.cn/ 
Data for 2006 are from Analysys International. June 5, 2007, accessed at http://comm.ccidnet.com/(in Chinese) 
Data for 2007 are from Imai, Kenichi, and Jingming Shiu (2009). “Mobile-Phone Industry [Keitai Denwa Sangyō]” in Junjiro 
Shintaku, and Tomofumi Amano (eds.) International Business Strategy of Manufacturing: Industrial Geography in Asia 
[Monodukuri no Kokusai Keiei Senryaku], Tokyo: Yuhikaku. 
Data for 2008 are from Analysys International. July 28, 2008, accessed at http://www.analysys.com.cn 
 
2. 3. The Third Phase 
 
The third and latest stage of growth began after 2004. With tightening competition 
including the increasing availability of illegal handsets (which were not included in the 
official figures), local firms as a category dropped their market share to about 40%. 
Although Lenovo was also unable to keep expanding market share indefinitely, as Table 
1 shows, they expanded their market share contrary to the contraction in market share 
experienced by local firms as a whole. 
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 In this stage, although local firms continued to depend on outside firms for 
developing and designing new models, they intended to expand their production process 
so as to partially design and develop models themselves. While the technology deficit 
made it difficult for Lenovo to stay at the forefront of expansion, the firm achieved 
growth by incorporating a marketing model based on Chinese consumer preferences. In 
the following chapters, we analyze the decision-making of boundaries under the 
technology deficit in the second and third phases. 
 
 
3. Analysis of the Second Phase 
 
3.1. Product structure and technology deficit 
 
In the Chinese handset industry, there is a technology deficit between local firms and 
foreign ones, though the situation is complicated by the fact that technology can reach 
maturity and the products structure has been simplified somewhat. The Global System 
for Mobile Communications (GSM), a second-generation mobile communications 
system (2G) that is prevalent in China, was taken up mainly by European countries in 
the mid-1990s and has now reached maturity, to the extent that some key components 
can be modularized. However the product structure is still complicated in comparison 
with other consumer electronics, and consequently the technology deficit is closely 
related with complexity of the composition of the product. 
 In terms of their structure, handsets are composed of hardware and software, 
each of which can be divided into three layers (see Figure 3). Hardware comprises the 
following layers: (1) the core layer, which contains mainly a radio frequency (RF) 
device for communication functions and information processing for processing signals; 
(2) the middle layer, which consists of a printed-circuit board (PCB) on which is 
mounted various import devices; and (3) the surface layer, which comprises the outer 
case of the handset and the keypad, both of which have to withstand frequent handling 
by users. Meanwhile the software comprises the following: (1) the core layer, which 
contains mainly the operating system (OS) for the basic software; (2) the middle layer, 
consisting of middleware for communication functions; and (3) the surface layer, which 
carries the user interface and various types of application software. 
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Figure 3: Product Structure 
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Source: The author's own creation according to various materials. 
 
 As we can see from Figure 3, the structure is a complicated one, but its 
intricacy has been simplified to some extent by partial modularization. The information 
processing element and the basic components of the OS and the middleware, all of 
which are contained within the bold line in the figure, have been modularized as 
platforms developed by major chip vendors such as Texas Instruments (United States). 
Major foreign firms also use platforms to develop and design new products. The handset 
manufacturers, therefore, do not need to independently develop key components for 
new-product development. 
 Thanks to the platforms, new entrants did not need to independently develop 
and design the more advanced technological content of the handsets, but they still 
needed sufficient development and design experience to have a good command of 
platform structure. The platforms developed by Texas Instruments demanded an 
advanced technological competence, and were not for inexperienced newcomers. 
Moreover, technical support is not always sufficient for their needs (an interview at 
Konka, July 26, 2006). In addition, the platforms are expensive and can be described as 
high-ends, whereas almost all of the local firms started out with units that were below 
the middle-end. In short, although ready-made platforms were available, they were not 
suitable for the limited technological capabilities of the local firms. 
The situation of China’s handset industry in the 1990s was very much one that 
was dominated by lack of technological capabilities. As mentioned above, the Chinese 
government launched a nationalization project for the handset industry, but the initiative 
was not a commercial success. Moreover, some major local electronics firms tried to 
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enter the industry and expand their market share, but gained only a foothold, and were 
unable to achieve large-scale production. 
 
3.2. Outsourcing 
 
Lacking as they were in technological capability, local firms turned to outside firms for 
design and manufacturing, and bought handsets mainly from original equipment 
manufacturing (OEM), original design manufacturing (ODM) firms and design houses 
in Korea and Taiwan. For example, Bird bought from Pantech (Korea), Sewon Telecom 
(Korea), BenQ (Taiwan) and Quanta Computer (Taiwan), while TCL purchased from 
Pantech (Korea), LG Electronics (Korea) and Hon Hai Precision Industry (Taiwan). It is 
said that in 2003, two-thirds of the handsets marketed by indigenous Chinese firms 
originated in Taiwan. Korean and Taiwanese firms provided almost all of the finished 
products and the Chinese firms, protected by the government licensing system, sold 
them under their own-brand logos. 
While the Chinese firms depended heavily on outside suppliers, their 
decision-making was shaped by two economic rationalities. Firstly, Korean and 
Taiwanese firms had already accumulated technology and know-how through orders 
from foreign firms and as a result of the stimulus provided by domestic competition. 
Although foreign firms which intended to enter the Chinese handset market were 
blocked by China’s protective industrial policy, they expanded their business through 
transactions with local firms. 
 Second, during this period, simple and low-cost handsets were in demand in 
the Chinese market, and Chinese firms had no need to offer a differentiated range of 
sophisticated handsets in these circumstances, simple basic specifications were enough 
to meet market demand from new subscribers. The basic specifications comprised 
phone call and SMS (short message service) functions. Simple and inexpensive 
handsets incorporating these two functions were important for new subscribers. 
 
3.3. Internalization 
 
Although local Chinese firms depended on Korean and Taiwanese suppliers, at the same 
time, they pursued a sales-and-marketing oriented strategy. For example, they focused 
on developing surface layers appropriate to the preferences of Chinese consumers. In 
addition, they launched major advertising campaigns, in particular via television, to 
 11
promote recognition of their new brands. Moreover, a distinguishing feature of the 
strategy of the local firms was that they independently constructed their own sales 
networks. Given the vast national land area of China, and the great distances involved in 
the transport of products, creative distribution policies were needed to expand sales. 
Figure 4 shows in diagrammatic form the general distribution channels for 
GSM handsets in China, and columns (1) and (2) show the distribution channels 
followed by foreign and local firms, respectively. A significant difference can be seen 
between the distribution strategies of domestic and foreign firms. After dispatching the 
products to a small number of national-level distributors, foreign firms were in general 
not involved with distribution within China, and handsets produced by them flowed 
from national-level distributors and thence to province-level and prefecture-level 
distributors and retailers. The advantage of this distribution policy was that the foreign 
firms were relieved of having to follow cost controls over the distribution channels; the 
disadvantage was that the firms were unable to control the distribution margins, which 
tended to increase along with each of the distribution stages. 
 
Figure 4: Distribution Channel 
Retailers
Users
(1) (2)
Sales subsidiariesProvince-level distributors
National-level distributors
Foreign firms Local firms
Prefecture-level distributors
 
Source: The author's own creation. 
 
 By contrast, major Chinese firms were closely involved with the distribution 
channels. They established sales subsidiaries at province level, and these subsidiaries 
carried out various sales policies, the details differing from one firm to another. 
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Generally, subsidiaries selected prefecture-level distributors and monitored the behavior 
of these distributors, especially as regards matters such as pricing and the choice of 
sales destinations. Moreover, subsidiaries sent sales promoters to retail shops to expand 
the sales of their own brand handsets. Bird in particular was strongly committed to this 
sales strategy and very substantially expanded its market share during this phase. For 
example in 2000, they set up 28 subsidiaries in provincial capitals and 300 offices in 
local major cities. 
 In constructing their own sales networks, firms were demonstrating a form of 
economic rationality. To increase their sales capabilities, firms needed to collect and 
analyze market information on each distribution stage, and to train salespersons and 
promoters. Foreign firms had already established close relationships with major 
distributors during a long period of transactions with them that began in the mid-1990s 
(Huang 2003), and this made it difficult for local firms to sell their products by way of 
the existing major distributors. Meanwhile for their part, the distributors were wary of 
devoting their human resources to transactions with specific local firms because of the 
uncertainty of the product volumes involved in the transactions. Consequently, local 
firms tended to be trapped inside a vicious circle in which their products were not taken 
up because of the expectation of poor sales, and it was to avoid this problem that major 
firms such as Bird and TCL, constructed their own sales networks to mobilize human 
resources for the expansion of sales. 
 This strategy enabled local firms to expand their market share, especially in 
small and medium local cities and in rural areas. Although during the 1990s handsets in 
China were expensive and mainly for business use, local firms sold simple functional 
ones through their own distribution channels and expanded their sales all over the 
country. The outcome was that the handset markets of the major cities were still largely 
dominated by foreign firms, whereas elsewhere in China, new subscribers welcomed the 
simple and low-cost handsets that were offered by the Chinese firms. In other words, 
local firms established their own presence by creating local and rural low-end markets. 
 
 
4. Analysis of the Third Phase 
 
4.1. Change in competition environment and technology deficit 
 
Changes in the competitive environment increasingly required local firms to 
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differentiate their products, and this requirement again confronted them with the 
realities of the technology deficit. 
The changes were caused by the following four trends, two of which were 
related to an increase in competitive pressures. First, foreign firms changed their 
strategies by developing new product lines that included low-end handsets, while 
altering their distribution channels so as to gain access to local markets. Second, a 
succession of new indigenous local firms entered the handset business following the 
easing and cancellation of the industrial policy that had been followed hitherto. In 
addition, illegal handsets began to be sold in high volumes in response to rapid market 
growth. The latter two trends were related to a weakening in the advantages hitherto 
enjoyed by local firms. First, as replacement demand began to increase, consumers’ 
tastes began to change and users started to demand more complicated and 
multi-functional models. In addition, chain retail stores (Gome, Suning, and so on) and 
new carriers entered the distribution business and in response to this, distribution 
channels diversified. The outcome was that local firms lost their advantages in business 
capability and were saddled with an excess of sales networks. 
These changes in the competitive environment meant that the focus of 
competition shifted to product differentiation. Because each firm extended its product 
range in an attempt to improve its brand appeal, about 600 models were launched every 
year. In consequence, the product life cycle has become shorter, and the average volume 
of shipments has also contracted. The price range now extends from low-end products 
retailing at 1,500 yuan and below (100 yuan = 14.5 U.S. dollars); through middle-end 
products selling at1,500-2,500 yuan; to high-end handsets that command a price of 
2,500 yuan and above. Models produced by the local firms are concentrated in the 
1,000-1,500 yuan price range. In this latter category, there is fierce competition and 
firms are under strong pressure to develop differentiated models. 
The differentiation requirement, however, has brought local firms face-to-face 
with the technology deficit. Following their entry, most local firms had concentrated 
their energies on the development of the sales-oriented strategy, therefore they 
accumulated little experience of technological development although platforms were 
available. Consequently there has been a significant gap in the accumulation of 
experience between the foreign and local firms, and this significant gap caused 
stagnation among the Chinese firms after 2003. 
In fact some local firms left the industry altogether. It is clear, in other words, 
that many local firms have experienced the disadvantages of backwardness more than 
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the advantages. 
 
4.2. Outsourcing 
 
Many local firms decided to depend on outside firms for development (and 
manufacturing), because they did not have enough technological expertise to embark on 
production on their own account. Although dependence on outside firms remained in 
place, the partners changed. The increase in demand for handsets led to the emergence 
of local Chinese design houses, devoted to the development of handsets, and many local 
firms began to abandon transactions with the OEM/ODM firms and started to buy 
handsets from Chinese design houses instead. The local design houses provided design 
services and offered handsets at lower prices than those charged by the OEM/ODM 
firms in Korea and Taiwan. 
Although the indigenous handset firms continued to depend on outsourcing, 
two new rationalities emerged. First, because design houses accepted orders from many 
local firms at the same time, there was a decrease in the average cost per model and 
firms began to accumulate experience for further technological development. 
 Second, because local firms were required to equal the functional complexity 
and design achieved by their rivals, they widened their product ranges with customers’ 
needs in mind. In this way, outsourcing was an efficient way in which to develop 
product ranges. 
 
4.3. Internalization 
 
While small and medium-sized local firms depended wholly on outsourcing, major local 
firms began to develop some new models by themselves. Although some firms did not 
succeed in developing new models, Lenovo expanded its market share by integrating a 
certain level of independent development capability with marketing ability. To 
accumulate a certain level of development capability, they made skilful use of 
easy-to-use platforms developed by the Taiwanese chip vendor, MediaTek (MTK).3 
 On the other hand, many major firms suffered setbacks in their attempts to 
accumulate a development capability. For example, although Bird agreed on the 
establishment of a fifty-fifty joint development base with Sagem (France), and TCL 
                                                 
3 On the role of chip vendors to local industrial development, see Shiu and Imai (2007). 
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virtually merged with the handset division of Alcatel (France) to enhance its 
development capability, management of joint ventures and M&A initiatives were never 
easy for inexperienced local firms to cope with. Consequently, many local firms were 
unable to improve their economic performance. 
 In response to this situation of stalemate, Taiwan’s MTK developed an 
easy-to-use platform for the Chinese handset industry. This platform includes a core 
hardware layer and almost all the software as circled with a bold line in Figure 5, and it 
has very much eased the difficulties of development. Although this simplification of 
product structure came at the expense of the potentialities for differentiation, the 
acceptance rate of MTK platforms among local firms jumped from 13 percent in 2004 
to 71 percent in 2005, an increase that reflects the advantage offered by the platform in 
the development process. Many major local firms, such as Bird, TCL, and Lenovo, have 
accepted MTK platforms. 
 
Figure 5: Product Structure (In the Case of Using the MTK Platform) 
Hardware Software
Radio frequency, Basic software (OS)
Data processing (baseband chip, etc.)
Circuit designed board, Communication middleware
Devices (display, camera, battery, etc.)  (protocol stack, etc.)
Housing, User interface (menu screen, etc.),
Key-board application software
Core layer
 Inter-
mediate
layer
Surface
layer
 
Source: The author's own creation. 
 
 Lenovo, in particular, grew by integrating a certain level of development 
capability with its own product policy at a time when other local firms were stagnating. 
Lenovo was one of the pioneers in the use of the MTK platform, and while other major 
local firms remained completely dependent on outside firms, Lenovo accumulated its 
own development experience. Because use of the MTK platform alone sacrificed 
potentialities for differentiation, Lenovo adopted a mix of MTK and various other 
platforms to retain dome of the potentialities (an interview at Lenovo, August 27, 2007). 
Exploiting its development capability with the MTK platform, Lenovo seized the 
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opportunity by launching a rapid succession of new products that suited the Chinese 
market. In 2004, for example, Lenovo changed its monochrome displays to color ones 
across its entire product range, and in 2005 the company launched handsets with an 
MP3 function at a time when this was becoming a popular feature. 
 To differentiate models, local firms needed to develop new models in the 
middle of their ranges to satisfy the market. However, design houses have no intention 
of devoting their human resources entirely to the requirements of specific local firms. 
As a result of this outlook, products developed by design houses have sometimes been 
inferior in quality. For this reason in particular, Lenovo decreased its dependency on 
outsourcing and began to develop its own models. They now market a range of models 
90% of which have been designed by the company. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, we have examined the way in which local Chinese firms confronted with a 
technology gap have achieved growth, using the Chinese handset industry as a case 
study. Chinese local firms have lacked technology, and have therefore turned to outside 
firms for development, design, and manufacturing, while they themselves have focused 
on sales and marketing, using their advantage of familiarity with the Chinese market. 
Consequently, by establishing a growth condition in which their selection of boundaries 
counterbalances the technology gap they have been able to expand their market share in 
comparison with foreign firms. 
 It follows that there is a possibility that local firms cannot achieve entry and 
growth in cases where there are few or no outside firms to turn to. For the Chinese local 
firms, the existence of the large Chinese market has worked well. The large market has 
provided opportunities for the entry of local design houses and has made it possible to 
launch easy-to-use platforms. In addition, the market has been big enough to provide 
room for the growth of local firms. In fact if the domestic market had not been so large, 
local firms might not have succeeded in achieving growth. Local firms operating in 
situations where market size is not as favorable as it is in China may need to utilize 
other advantages and characteristics peculiar to their own countries. 
 In cases in which local firms have achieved growth even though they have been 
confronted with a significant technology gap in competition with foreign firms, there 
are possibilities that boundaries of local firms have been diversified thanks to the 
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availability of advantages particular to each country and each industry. The growth 
process of the Chinese handset firms shows that local firms try to grow by a creative 
selection of boundaries. Globalization on its own does not guarantee the growth of local 
firms in developing countries nor does it necessarily impede such growth. 
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